security transportation united states

Duty of Care for Business Travel – Why Secure Transportation is Critical

Duty of Care for Business Travelers – Why Secure Executive Transportation is a Critical Aspect

The need for employers to meet their duty of care requirements to employees is a complex process to navigate for many organizations. Understanding what measures you can take to manage this level of risk remains a considerable challenge. Incorporating the use of secure executive transportation into your travel risk management plans is a prudent move to reduce this risk and keep your people safe. Now, more than ever the need arises as to how best to meet this legal obligation for staff and employees who are traveling overseas on company business. The constituent groups this affects are varied, ranging from executives, accompanying spouses and dependents, students, teachers, volunteer groups, contractors – the list goes on.

Duty of Care – A Definition

The broadly accepted definition of Duty of Care is: ‘is a legal obligation, which is imposed on an individual requiring adherence to a standard of reasonable care while performing any acts that could foreseeably harm others. It is the first element that must be established to proceed with an action in negligence.’ Moreover there is now a growing recognition both in the courts and with potential plaintiffs that breaches of duty of care occurring abroad can be heard in U.S. courts. The number of cases being presented has increased and employment lawyers are particularly alert to the issue.

security transportation united states
security transportation united states

Secure Transportation Considerations when Overseas

This sets an additional standard to be met by employers – in that the measures in place to meet the requirement at home may not suffice abroad. In fact, it is almost certain that it won’t. Your senior executives and traveling staff members will likely be most at risk and exposed to hazards when in transit – particularly when traveling by road or awaiting transportation outside of an airport, venue or business premises. If you are not paying attention to the additional safety and security transportation united states needs for staff on travel abroad then it is highly likely that you may be placing your own organization at risk – both in terms of their physical safety, but also of potential future litigation.

Increasing levels of risk for the Business Traveler

The much publicized case in 2015 of former NGO worker Steve Dennis provides an excellent example. Dennis, a former staff member of the Norwegian Re (NRC) is sued the agency, claiming gross negligence and failure in duty of care after he was kidnapped and shot in Dadaab, Kenya. Dennis was traveling in a convoy through the camp when his car came under attack. The driver was killed, Dennis was shot in the leg and he and three other colleagues were taken captive. Interviewed in 2015, Dennis stated that: “Like everyone going into a risky situation for work, I believe there’s a minimum level of training and procedures required and when it’s not there I believe there should be accountability for it. This case absolutely highlights the need to have deliberate and sensible measures in place for employees traveling abroad – especially in an environment where there is an increased level of risk. Not only is transportation key, but also training employees – click here to learn about the Explore Secure® online travel safety training.

How Secure Executive Transportation can protect your Company

Employers and HR managers can help protect their staff (and indeed themselves) by reviewing their procedures and policies. Consider the use of pre-travel training packages or courses to prepare their people for the trips. Then, consider what can be done in-country to further reduce risk. As most issues and incidents tend to arise when people are in transit (especially traveling in vehicles on roads) a further consideration must be the use of secure executive transportation – with trained and vetted drivers. In higher risk environments with an increase likelihood of criminal activity, you may wish to use the enhanced services of a close protection officer in conjunction with secure transportation. It will keep you out of the courts – but above all will set conditions for a safer workplace abroad which in turn will allow your staff to focus on your organizational goals.

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armored vehicle brazil

What are the Armored Vehicle Ratings?

Armored Vehicle Ratings – What do armor ratings mean?

Are you considering utilizing an armored vehicle? Perhaps you are heading to an area of increased risk and want to understand more about armored vehicle brazil, or are considering Armored Vehicle Rental.

There are two main primary standards used to rate armor – The NIJ and the EN standard.

armored vehicle brazil

The NIJ (the U.S body) is considered the world leader for ballistic testing for armor, they perform a full range of tests and provide details of the results in their armor standards. These show the range of protection offered by the different pieces of armor tested, from low powered hand guns, up to armor piercing rifle rounds. They provide 8 classifications of protection known as threat levels which are Class I, IIA, II, IIIA, III, IV, V & VI.

In other regions, predominantly Europe they are typically rated as levels B1-B7 using the Standard EN1063 scale. Both scales are similar in how they rate protection. Armor is typically tested at ranges from 5 meters to 15 meters, depending upon the class/rating and weapon. The class most likely to be found utilized and available on LATAM armored vehicles for rent is Class NIJ IIIA/ and EN standard B4. This will defeat .44 Magnum rounds, 9mm, 12 gauge shotguns and lesser threats.

Higher rated armor is available though always at a premium and is often dedicated to those at an increased level of risk. Class NIJ III/B5 is capable of defeating 7.62 rounds from a Kalishnikov rifle at 5 meters. The ratings then go up to counter significant caliber threats. At the B6/NIJ IV level and above the armor is designed to stop multiple 7.62 up to 30.06 AP (Armor Piercing) and Penetrator rounds and are also resistant to explosions.

Article Source: https://ets-riskmanagement.com/what-are-the-armored-vehicle-ratings/

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insider threat program

Insider Threat A Beginners Guide

What your company spent years to develop can be lost in an instant at the hands of one bad intentioned employee. The statistics on employee theft of intellectual property (IP) paint a dark portrait of what employees do when disgruntled, moving on, or stockpiling for a rainy day. William Evanina, the U.S. government’s National Counterintelligence Executive in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence says, “As a corporate leader, the single most important investment in protecting your proprietary information and sensitive trade secrets is developing a viable and enterprise-wide insider threat program”.

To paraphrase the well-worn mantra on hacking and apply it to the pandemic of Insider Threat: There are two types of companies, those whose employees have already stolen IP, and those who simply don’t know it yet.  No matter where your company is along its journey toward an effective insider threat program, success or failure is measured by the last harmful egress of research, formulas, algorithms,  strategies, service manuals, or other critical business information (CBI). Whether your effort to detect, deter, and prevent CBI loss has become an industry model or is still a nascent vision, three common components can help build a new plan or help review and adapt a mature program.

Security professionals exploring insider threat fundamentals can take a lesson from first year journalism students. Budding reporters are trained to instinctively repeat basic questions designed to get to the truth, and three of those questions drive formation of all Insider Threat programs: “What?”; “Where?”; and, “Who?” Security leaders should make it their practice to ask these three questions of their staff, key partners, and operational components of their companies. What is it that most merits protection? Where is this most critical information located, physically and in cyber space? Who amongst us requires regular access to CBI?

insider threat program

As the past head of counterintelligence for the FBI, a former corporate security executive for one of the world’s largest companies, and now a risk management consultant, it no longer surprises me to hear new security professionals struggle to answer these basic questions. Security practitioners sometimes perpetuate the long-standing C-suite myth that “security’s got this” when it comes to everything from a missing gym bag to a missing gyroscope. The perception that someone, somewhere, must have already addressed, planned for, or is in the process of resolving the concern of the moment, provides comfort to our senior executives and job assurance for those of us in the profession. But the comfort is dangerous and the assurance is hollow. Rather, we should work to dispel the notion that security can or should protect everything. To do that, the savvy security executive endeavors to first identify and then deeply understand exactly what represents the future of the company, where it resides, and which employees have stewardship of this lifeblood. Done correctly, in partnership with key stakeholders including Human Resources (HR), Legal, IT Risk, and Engineering, Science or Business leaders, this approach provides laser-like focus on what really matters, shares ownership across components, and generates  confidence in a process designed to protect against existential threats to jobs and share price.

Build Your Team

Successful implementation of insider threat programs hinge on assembling the right team. IP protection is a team sport and should not be carried out by one component alone. The team requires willful senior level participants who are convinced the time is right to defend the company against the threat from within. Leadership is often motivated to take this step by a crisis sparked by the loss or near loss of a trade secret at the hands of a departing or on-board employee or contractor. But waiting for such a crisis is not advisable. Gather data on losses suffered within your industry, supply chain, or customers. Talk to FBI corporate outreach contacts and ask for examples of economic espionage targeting your technologies. Talk to HR about where employees go when they depart and ask those employee’s former managers whether cumulative losses pose a concern.

Meet one-on-one with a senior thought leader in Legal, IT Risk, HR, Business Development, or Research and ask them to partner with you to assemble a team and form an Insider Threat program. Next, meet unilaterally with each proposed team member to brief them on the threat and risk to proprietary data and seek their support to more strongly defend the company. In some non-defense corporate cultures, using the phrase “Insider Threat” can still generate privacy, trust, and culture concerns. In one large company, a security leader’s proposal to discuss such a program was met with this question from the head of HR, “Do you not think we should trust our employees?” The security leader responded, “I do, and I think we should have mechanisms in place to defend our trust.” Meeting first with each partner will allow you to listen to their concerns. Limit the team to five or six decision makers from key functions. When the team is assembled start asking the first of the Journalism 101 questions.

What?

Whether a newly appointed security leader or seasoned veteran, the question at the heart of IP protection is, “What exactly are we protecting?” Responses provided by security and business leaders to this single question help measure the need for an Insider Threat initiative or the maturity of an existing program. Common responses from the security ranks include; “I’m protecting these buildings”, “I’m protecting this campus”, “I’m protecting people”.  Even security professionals in large, sophisticated corporations frequently do not cite, “ideas”, “research”, “technologies”, or “critical employees”, when asked what they protect. Follow up questions on which campuses, buildings, or people are more critical than others are sometimes met with silence or criticism that the question implies some employees are more important than others. One long-tenured security leader responded by displaying his daily automated reports advising him which doors, hallways and offices were entered, but, he could neither articulate which company functions occurred there nor how his data was relevant.

Importantly, your team should pose the “What” question to key business leaders including the CEO, General Counsel, CFO, Supply Chain leader, Research or Engineering executives, Business Development or Sales heads, and corporate audit manager. Provide context by framing the question as an attempt to identify the small subset of proprietary information that would most damage the company if it fell into the wrong hands. Various formulas and thresholds can be customized to help guide this discussion and quantify the degree of damage to finances, share price and reputational risk.

Where?

Security professionals can only truly protect that which they know is there. Once CBI is identified, the team must learn where it resides, in both physical and cyber space. In large companies with thousands of employees and facilities, this question is more easily asked than answered. Yet, the answer is vital to learning how your CBI is exposed. One large company locating its CBI discovered a proprietary formula sitting in an open folder accessible by its entire employee population. Audit of the folder revealed that employees in high risk nations had visited the folder without any valid reason.

When countering the insider threat, the physical and the cyber security of CBI must be viewed as one holistic endeavor. The behavior of data and the behavior of humans are inextricably linked and the partnership between IT Risk and Physical Security should be seamless. Once aware that specific buildings, offices, or laboratories contain CBI, protocols and checklists for enhanced safeguarding can be drafted. This initiative counters more than just the internal threat. Upon learning the location of a sensitive manufacturing process one company found the process was part of a public tour route.

Who?

The seemingly simple “Who” question can generate more consternation than the previous two questions combined, particularly from your partners in HR and Labor & Employment Law.  While answering the first two questions is often labor intensive, this last query raises issues of policy, organizational culture, and law. Companies may learn that some CBI is assigned to contractors, and the team must wrestle with the issue of whether people with less allegiance, and more transient tenure, should be entrusted with the firm’s future. Yet, identifying employees who require access to CBI is easy compared to planning how to relate to them. This discussion should include: standards for employees to receive and maintain CBI access; policies on travel and device security; enhanced computer monitoring; and, governance protocols for investigative response to suspicious conduct. Importantly, the approach to such vital and often singularly knowledgeable employees should be an inclusive one that views them as special stewards with more responsibility than the average employee.

If approached carelessly, insider threat plans can breed mistrust, alienate key employees, erode company culture, and even violate labor or privacy laws. But, a quality program can be a leader’s most important legacy, reaping tangible dividends in loss prevented, jobs saved, and relationships forged.

Originally posted in the Security Magazine https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/88644-insider-threat-programs-a-beginners-guide

Article Source: https://ets-riskmanagement.com/insider-threat-a-beginners-guide/

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ProtectiveSurveillance

Hostile Surveillance Detection

The global kidnap industry is booming and no longer is the focus predominantly on Latin America. It is prevalent throughout the world and for a successful kidnap, hostiles will normally conduct some degree of pre-attack intelligence gathering. The early and covert identification of this intelligence gathering by security teams can significantly minimize the risk of kidnap.

To provide a professional security service it is imperative that security teams and the ‘at-risk’ individuals themselves learn how to identify the signs that may precede an attack. By identifying a threat early, and pro-actively working in unison to increase awareness, the risk of a successful kidnap is drastically reduced. The preemptive action and early identification of possible hostile intent allow a security team to remove the client from danger or deter and disrupt the potential attackers.

Scoping for Opportunity

Why would kidnappers put a person or group under protective surveillance Australia prior to an attack? What would the hostile surveillance teams be trying to achieve? Business executives when planning strategy utilizes the SWOT analysis model. This same model can be engineered to help identify what hostile individuals or groups will be looking for.

SWOT Analysis

By identifying a target’s Strengths and Weaknesses, the hostiles will then be able to identify their own Opportunities and Threats. This intelligence-gathering model will help them answer the following questions:

  1. Can we kidnap our target?
  2. How can we kidnap our target?
  3. When could we kidnap our target?
  4. Should we kidnap this target?

Point four identifies that the hostiles may want to carry out the kidnap but realize that it is a hard target and therefore not worth the risk, OR as can be seen in the case study below, they may just adapt their attack and exploit the weaknesses they have identified.

ETS

In March 1978, Former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro was being driven to work in a two-car motorcade in Rome, accompanied by five bodyguards. His Motorcade was ambushed and eleven members of the Red Brigade terrorist group ambushed him. As the motorcade approached a stop sign a car pulled in front and stopped suddenly. Moro’s car was following too close and struck the car, then Moro’s follow vehicle, also traveling too close, rammed into Moro’s car pinning his vehicle with no chance of immediate escape.

Two men got out of the blocking vehicle and shot with pistols through the front side windows of Moro’s car killing his driver and bodyguard. Concurrently, a second attack element consisting of four men dressed in Air Italia uniforms that were stood on the pavement as if waiting for a bus pulled weapons from their flight bags and proceeded to fire at the remaining bodyguards. A third attack element of two terrorists jumped out from behind bushes (possibly within a car) and pulled Moro from the car and put him into a waiting vehicle. The terrorists then escaped with preplanned and strategically positioned vehicles.

The whole operation lasted no more than 30 seconds, involved eleven terrorists who fired between 80 and 90 rounds and killed five bodyguards. Yet the build-up and preparation were far more detailed and time-consuming.  Through prolonged covert surveillance and potentially a mix of human intelligence sources the terrorists had identified the strengths and weaknesses of Moro and his security team and utilized these to focus on the opportunities and threats.

The terrorists identified a pattern of life and common route that Moro and his team used. They had also noted that the drivers of both his motorcade drove too close to each other and tailgated other vehicles and the Red Brigade planned to exploit that. They also noted that many airline personnel lived in the area of attack so adopted the air uniforms for cover. The terrorists did several other things that would have been gained through intelligence gathering operations. They slashed the tires of the flower vendor whose normal place of work was near the attack site, telephone lines were overloaded during the attack and vehicles were positioned for a getaway.

There are many conspiracy theories surrounding his capture and detention, whatever the true story, fifty-five days after his abduction Aldo Moro was found shot to death in the trunk of a car in Central Rome. It is interesting to note that according to later terrorist declarations, in the months before the kidnapping they had instead envisaged the possibility of kidnapping another leader, Giulio Andreotti. This was abandoned once they deemed that Andreotti’s police protection was too strong.

Sourced from: Just2Seconds: Using Time And Space To Defeat Assassins. 2008, Gavin De Becker, Tom Taylor and Jeff Marquart.

This case study identifies how focused surveillance can be utilized to identify and exploit weaknesses and enable efficient and successful attack planning, even against a defended ‘hard’ target such as a Former Italian Prime Minister.

Intelligence Gathering

Just as the Red Brigade terrorist group did in the case study, hostiles will be trying to gather as much intelligence on the target’s pattern of life as possible, asking themselves the following questions and many more:

  • Is there security, are they aware, are they armed, are they any good?
  • How do they travel and by what means? Do they drive, what do they drive, is it armored?
  • Do they have good travel security in place?
  • What routes do they take to work, events, school? Do they vary routes?  Are they forced to take the same routes?
  • Do they have a family, is there family an easier target?
  • Are they creatures of habit? Is there a pattern forming? If so what is the pattern? What are the weaknesses?
  • Do they have employees, can we use them, can they provide us with information, can we corrupt them?

The hostiles, however, must have the capability to gather this information, it cannot just be plucked from the air. Where intelligence gathering and Protective Surveillance Australia operations come into play, there are always limitations.

Capability and Limitations

The quality and type of hostile surveillance can vary greatly, it may be quick and basic observations by untrained and opportunistic gangs looking for the best time to strike, or it could be professional, criminal organizations carrying out effective and focused intelligence gathering prior to a kidnap or assault.

There are of course a number of potential limitations to a hostile surveillance team, these will affect the quality and capability of the surveillance. Examples of limitations are:

  • Training
  • Capability
  • Resources – Human and Technical
  • Finances
  • Environment

All the above factors will determine how capable a group is of carrying out effective and covert surveillance without detection, whilst still obtaining all the necessary information.

Many terrorist and criminal organizations may not have the technical and practical expertise to carry out a high level of surveillance that is required to defeat good anti and counter surveillance procedure. They may only have one or two people with limited skills and resources to observe their target compared to the ten or twenty that a government team has available.

Numbers do not necessarily mean results though, a team of three well-trained surveillance operatives with time and resources would be able to glean a surprising amount of intelligence, perhaps even within a few days. Specifically, when dealing with high-risk clients it must always be taken into account that a hostile group may in-fact have a good capability and a small professional team with time, patience and resources.

The large range of limiting factors will, however, normally provide the security team a much greater chance of identifying hostile surveillance, but two major factors must be taken into consideration. The first is that terrorist and criminal organizations normally have time and dedication on their side. They can pop in and pop out, they can choose their times and methods, they can also utilize human sources and agents. All the time slowly building up their intelligence picture. The second and most important to acknowledge and understand though is that accurately and covertly identifying surveillance is far from easy.

Skills and Drills

There are two factors that must be taken into account when dealing with hostile surveillance detection:

  1. The skills, experience, knowledge, and resources of the person or group carrying out the hostile surveillance.

BUT ALSO…

2. The skills, experience, knowledge, and resources of the person or group carrying out the anti and counter surveillance.

Whilst attempting to identify hostile surveillance it is important that tactics are undertaken to a high standard, but also covertly. This is just one of the reasons why intensive training and specialist counter surveillance teams should always be considered, especially for high-risk clientele. Whatever the level of hostile surveillance being conducted, whether it be rudimentary or highly professional it is important that hostile surveillance does not realize that anti and counter-surveillance measures are in place and being utilized. There are two main reasons:

  • If hostile surveillance is unaware of the counter-measures in place they are far more likely to make a mistake, use sloppy tradecraft or become complacent and therefore be identified easier and quicker.
  • If hostile surveillance becomes aware that they have been spotted it can lead to a number of possible actions including, impulsive behavior and an increased risk of action or attack. But, and this is more likely, they may just take a step back to then take two steps forward in the future, with better skills and resources. As we mentioned dedicated and professional teams will spot poor anti and counter surveillance early, they will drop out and only come back when they feel it is safe to do so.

It is clear that a hostile surveillance detection is a vital tool in trying to minimize the risk of kidnap. Those that wish harm on others, especially professional and dedicated terrorist or criminal organizations will strive to gather intelligence on their targets. With this intelligence, they will look to exploit the weaknesses of a target and turn these into opportunities for a successful attack.

Remember, if there is a gap between the skills, experience, knowledge, and resources of the hostile surveillance team and those of the security team, one side will falter.

 

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Hostile Surveillance Detection

The global kidnap industry is booming and no longer is the focus predominantly on Latin America. It is prevalent throughout the world and for a successful kidnap, hostiles will normally conduct some degree of pre-attack intelligence gathering. The early and covert identification of this intelligence gathering by security teams can significantly minimize the risk of kidnap.

To provide a professional security service it is imperative that security teams and the ‘at-risk’ individuals themselves learn how to identify the signs that may precede an attack. By identifying a threat early, and pro-actively working in unison to increase awareness, the risk of a successful kidnap is drastically reduced. The preemptive action and early identification of possible hostile intent allow a security team to remove the client from danger or deter and disrupt the potential attackers.

Scoping for Opportunity

Why would kidnappers put a person or group under protective surveillance prior to an attack? What would the hostile surveillance teams be trying to achieve? Business executives when planning strategy utilizes the SWOT analysis model. This same model can be engineered to help identify what hostile individuals or groups will be looking for.

SWOT Analysis

By identifying a target’s Strengths and Weaknesses, the hostiles will then be able to identify their own Opportunities and Threats. This intelligence-gathering model will help them answer the following questions:

  1. Can we kidnap our target?
  2. How can we kidnap our target?
  3. When could we kidnap our target?
  4. Should we kidnap this target?

Point four identifies that the hostiles may want to carry out the kidnap but realize that it is a hard target and therefore not worth the risk, OR as can be seen in the case study below, they may just adapt their attack and exploit the weaknesses they have identified.

In March 1978, Former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro was being driven to work in a two-car motorcade in Rome, accompanied by five bodyguards. His Motorcade was ambushed and eleven members of the Red Brigade terrorist group ambushed him. As the motorcade approached a stop sign a car pulled in front and stopped suddenly. Moro’s car was following too close and struck the car, then Moro’s follow vehicle, also traveling too close, rammed into Moro’s car pinning his vehicle with no chance of immediate escape.

17320119537

Two men got out of the blocking vehicle and shot with pistols through the front side windows of Moro’s car killing his driver and bodyguard. Concurrently, a second attack element consisting of four men dressed in Air Italia uniforms that were stood on the pavement as if waiting for a bus pulled weapons from their flight bags and proceeded to fire at the remaining bodyguards. A third attack element of two terrorists jumped out from behind bushes (possibly within a car) and pulled Moro from the car and put him into a waiting vehicle. The terrorists then escaped with preplanned and strategically positioned vehicles.

The whole operation lasted no more than 30 seconds, involved eleven terrorists who fired between 80 and 90 rounds and killed five bodyguards. Yet the build-up and preparation were far more detailed and time-consuming.  Through prolonged covert surveillance and potentially a mix of human intelligence sources the terrorists had identified the strengths and weaknesses of Moro and his security team and utilized these to focus on the opportunities and threats.

The terrorists identified a pattern of life and common route that Moro and his team used. They had also noted that the drivers of both his motorcade drove too close to each other and tailgated other vehicles and the Red Brigade planned to exploit that. They also noted that many airline personnel lived in the area of attack so adopted the air uniforms for cover. The terrorists did several other things that would have been gained through intelligence gathering operations. They slashed the tires of the flower vendor whose normal place of work was near the attack site, telephone lines were overloaded during the attack and vehicles were positioned for a getaway.

There are many conspiracy theories surrounding his capture and detention, whatever the true story, fifty-five days after his abduction Aldo Moro was found shot to death in the trunk of a car in Central Rome. It is interesting to note that according to later terrorist declarations, in the months before the kidnapping they had instead envisaged the possibility of kidnapping another leader, Giulio Andreotti. This was abandoned once they deemed that Andreotti’s police protection was too strong.

Sourced from: Just2Seconds: Using Time And Space To Defeat Assassins. 2008, Gavin De Becker, Tom Taylor and Jeff Marquart.

This case study identifies how focused surveillance can be utilized to identify and exploit weaknesses and enable efficient and successful attack planning, even against a defended ‘hard’ target such as a Former Italian Prime Minister.

Intelligence Gathering

Just as the Red Brigade terrorist group did in the case study, hostiles will be trying to gather as much intelligence on the target’s pattern of life as possible, asking themselves the following questions and many more:

  • Is there security, are they aware, are they armed, are they any good?
  • How do they travel and by what means? Do they drive, what do they drive, is it armored?
  • Do they have good travel security in place?
  • What routes do they take to work, events, school? Do they vary routes?  Are they forced to take the same routes?
  • Do they have a family, is there family an easier target?
  • Are they creatures of habit? Is there a pattern forming? If so what is the pattern? What are the weaknesses?
  • Do they have employees, can we use them, can they provide us with information, can we corrupt them?

The hostiles, however, must have the capability to gather this information, it cannot just be plucked from the air. Where intelligence gathering and Protective Surveillance operations come into play, there are always limitations.

Capability and Limitations

The quality and type of hostile surveillance can vary greatly, it may be quick and basic observations by untrained and opportunistic gangs looking for the best time to strike, or it could be professional, criminal organizations carrying out effective and focused intelligence gathering prior to a kidnap or assault.

There are of course a number of potential limitations to a hostile surveillance team, these will affect the quality and capability of the surveillance. Examples of limitations are:

  • Training
  • Capability
  • Resources – Human and Technical
  • Finances
  • Environment

All the above factors will determine how capable a group is of carrying out effective and covert surveillance without detection, whilst still obtaining all the necessary information.

Many terrorist and criminal organizations may not have the technical and practical expertise to carry out a high level of surveillance that is required to defeat good anti and counter surveillance procedure. They may only have one or two people with limited skills and resources to observe their target compared to the ten or twenty that a government team has available.

Numbers do not necessarily mean results though, a team of three well-trained surveillance operatives with time and resources would be able to glean a surprising amount of intelligence, perhaps even within a few days. Specifically, when dealing with high-risk clients it must always be taken into account that a hostile group may in-fact have a good capability and a small professional team with time, patience and resources.

The large range of limiting factors will, however, normally provide the security team a much greater chance of identifying hostile surveillance, but two major factors must be taken into consideration. The first is that terrorist and criminal organizations normally have time and dedication on their side. They can pop in and pop out, they can choose their times and methods, they can also utilize human sources and agents. All the time slowly building up their intelligence picture. The second and most important to acknowledge and understand though is that accurately and covertly identifying surveillance is far from easy.

Skills and Drills

There are two factors that must be taken into account when dealing with hostile surveillance detection:

  1. The skills, experience, knowledge, and resources of the person or group carrying out the hostile surveillance.

BUT ALSO…

2. The skills, experience, knowledge, and resources of the person or group carrying out the anti and counter surveillance.

Whilst attempting to identify hostile surveillance it is important that tactics are undertaken to a high standard, but also covertly. This is just one of the reasons why intensive training and specialist counter surveillance teams should always be considered, especially for high-risk clientele. Whatever the level of hostile surveillance being conducted, whether it be rudimentary or highly professional it is important that hostile surveillance does not realize that anti and counter-surveillance measures are in place and being utilized. There are two main reasons:

  • If hostile surveillance is unaware of the counter-measures in place they are far more likely to make a mistake, use sloppy tradecraft or become complacent and therefore be identified easier and quicker.
  • If hostile surveillance becomes aware that they have been spotted it can lead to a number of possible actions including, impulsive behavior and an increased risk of action or attack. But, and this is more likely, they may just take a step back to then take two steps forward in the future, with better skills and resources. As we mentioned dedicated and professional teams will spot poor anti and counter surveillance early, they will drop out and only come back when they feel it is safe to do so.

It is clear that a hostile surveillance detection is a vital tool in trying to minimize the risk of kidnap. Those that wish harm on others, especially professional and dedicated terrorist or criminal organizations will strive to gather intelligence on their targets. With this intelligence, they will look to exploit the weaknesses of a target and turn these into opportunities for a successful attack.

Remember, if there is a gap between the skills, experience, knowledge, and resources of the hostile surveillance team and those of the security team, one side will falter.

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